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RENDERING TURNER TOOTHLESS:
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN
BEARD V. BANKS
JENNIFER N. WIMSATT†
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has long recognized that prisoners’
constitutional rights must be balanced against the need for deference
to the decisions of prison administrators when prisoners’ rights are
restricted incident to their incarceration. The Court, however, has
never explicitly recognized a theory of proper incarceration, yet it has
implicitly adopted such a theory through its decisions regarding the
constitutionally permitted level of restriction on particular prisoners’
rights. This Note argues that the Court’s prisoners’ rights
jurisprudence evinces a particular definition of proper incarceration
and then reads the multiple opinions in Beard v. Banks consistently
with that theory.

INTRODUCTION
“The United States has considerably more violent crime and
1
vastly more punishment than any other prosperous democracy.”
“There has been a fivefold increase in the number of incarcerated
individuals over the last thirty years.”2 “In 2006, over 7.2 million
people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on parole” in the
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1. CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 21 (John Kaplan et al. eds., 5th ed. 2004).
2. Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2006).
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United States. As of December 2006, 2,258,983 individuals were
incarcerated in the United States,4 roughly five out of every one
thousand Americans.5 For certain segments of the population, the
statistics are far bleaker. At the end of 2006, 3.04 percent of black
males were prison inmates, compared with 1.26 percent of Hispanic
males and 0.49 percent of white males.6
Such incarceration has been justified primarily by two theories:

What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is
justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is
morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in
proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished
follows from his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate
punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of affairs
where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the
state of affairs where he does not; and it is better irrespective of any
of the consequences of punishing him.
What we may call the utilitarian view holds that on the principle
that bygones are bygones and that only future consequences are
material to present decisions, punishment is justifiable only by
reference to the probable consequences of maintaining it as one of
the devices of the social order. Wrongs committed in the past are, as
such, not relevant considerations for deciding what to do. If
punishment can be shown to promote effectively the interest of
7
society it is justifiable, otherwise it is not.

The American system of incarceration is based on these two theories,
and the states along with prison administrators often tailor
incarceration in their jurisdictions to further these goals.
“Determinations about the nature and purposes of punishment
for criminal acts implicate difficult and enduring questions respecting
the sanctity of the individual, the nature of law, and the relation

3. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Corrections Statistics, http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
4. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison Statistics, http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
5. See id. (“[T]here were an estimated 501 prison inmates per 100,000 U.S.
Residents . . . .”).
6. See id. (“At yearend 2006 there were 3,042 black male sentenced prison inmates per
100,000 black males in the United States, compared to 1,261 Hispanic male inmates per 100,000
Hispanic males and 487 white male inmates per 100,000 white males.”).
7. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955).
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8
between law and the social order.” The “penological goals of
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation”9 can justify
a variety of legitimate penological schemes, “[a]nd the responsibility
for making these fundamental choices and implementing them lies
with the legislature.”10 Furthermore, “the fixing of prison terms for
specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a
general matter, is ‘properly within the province of legislatures, not
courts.’”11 Thus, “reviewing courts . . . should grant substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess
12
in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.”
Notwithstanding this deference to legislatures, the Court has set
some limits on the types of constitutionally acceptable punishment.
“[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections
13
when he is imprisoned for crime,” and he does “not forfeit all
constitutional protections by reason of [his] conviction and
14
confinement” alone. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment protects prisoners,15 but their constitutional
16
protections do not stop there. The Court explained, “[O]ur cases
have held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and
religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, . . . [and] they
are protected against invidious discrimination on the basis of race
under the Equal Protection Clause.”17 Finally, “they may claim the
protection of the Due Process Clause to prevent additional
18
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
Although “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison

8. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 999.
10. Id. at 998.
11. Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)).
12. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
13. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
14. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
16. But see Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582–83 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that legislatures and prison officials constitutionally have the ability to
define punishment in any way that does not exceed the limits of the Eighth Amendment).
17. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964)).
18. Id. at 545 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 539).
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inmates from the protections of the Constitution,” “the Constitution
sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it
would allow elsewhere.”20
Prisoners’ retention of their constitutional rights and their ability
to appeal to courts for protection are of particular importance given
their place in society. Incarcerated criminal offenders “constitute a
despised minority without political power to influence the policies of
legislative and executive officials.”21 Prisoners are “routinely and
22
permanently disenfranchised.” As “‘constitutional outsiders’ replete
with . . . ‘spoiled identities,’”23 prisoners lack the ability to affect the
legislature during their imprisonment when prison regulations
deprive them of life, liberty, and property and often do not regain
that ability upon release from prison.24
In prisoners’ rights cases, the Supreme Court has historically
balanced this need for protection of the rights of politically powerless
prisoners with the need for deference to legislatures and prison
25
administrators. In balancing these ideals, however, the Court has
refused to find that the adoption of any particular penological theory
is mandated by the Constitution26 and has left the difficult task of
dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison

19. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). This language was also used by the Court in
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989), and by the concurrence in Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court has similarly stated that “[t]here is
no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.” McDonnell,
418 U.S. at 555–56.
20. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (plurality opinion).
21. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 292 (2d ed.
1997).
22. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 441, 459 (1999). Many states permanently disenfranchise felons. Id. The Supreme Court
accepted the constitutionality of this practice in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974),
upholding a California law permanently disenfranchising all felons. Id. at 56.
23. James E. Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as “Outsiders” and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 198 (2001).
24. See id. (“[I]nmates had nary a voice in the legislative debate over the proposed
legislation.”). This is because they are disenfranchised. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459; see
also Geiger, supra note 2, at 1191 (“Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised.”).
25. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“Traditionally, federal courts
have adopted a broad hands-off attitude towards problems of prison administration. . . . [T]his
attitude springs from . . . perceptions about the nature of the problems and efficacy of judicial
intervention. . . . But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims . . . .”).
26. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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27
administration to prison administrators themselves. It has also
declined to craft a theory of proper incarceration, but has
nevertheless found that some rights are “inconsistent with proper
28
incarceration.”
This Note argues that despite the Court’s explicit claims to the
contrary, it has in fact created and implemented an ascertainable
theory of proper incarceration through its prisoners’ rights cases. It
29
also argues that the Court’s decision in Beard v. Banks should be
read in a way that is consistent with this theory and should represent
further development of this theory in the realm of deprivations for
rehabilitation. Part I outlines the broader legal history of prisoners’
30
rights cases, with a particular focus on Turner v. Safley, which
provided the balancing test used in Banks. Part II discusses the
Supreme Court’s decision in Beard v. Banks. Finally, Part III analyzes
the test for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on
prisoners’ rights and the proper amount of deference to be given
prison administrators. This Part interprets the theory of proper
incarceration implicitly developed and implemented by the Court and
locates within Banks a way to further develop that theory consistent
with precedent.

I. BACKGROUND
The Court has sought to balance the rights retained by prisoners
with the goals of effective and efficient prison administration through
its prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. It has tried to maintain meaningful
judicial review while deferring to the legislature and prison officials to
set and administer prison policy. Initially, the Court’s cases lacked a
coherent standard for reviewing prisoners’ rights claims and balancing
27. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404–05.
28. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510–11 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny instead
of the deferential Turner standard because the Court has “applied Turner’s reasonable
relationship test only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper incarceration’”). The majority
in Johnson did not explicitly refuse to determine what proper incarceration should entail;
instead it decided the case without crafting any theory of proper incarceration because it found
equal protection was not inconsistent with proper incarceration. Id. at 510–11, 515. Justice
Thomas, however, argued in his dissent that by inquiring whether equal protection was
consistent with proper prison administration, the majority in fact impermissibly substituted its
conception of proper incarceration for that of the prison officials. Id. at 541–43 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). For a definition of the term “theory of proper incarceration” and an explanation of
the Court’s theory, see infra Part III.A.
29. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
30. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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these concerns. Then, in Turner v. Safley, the Court developed the
reasonable relationship test to clear up confusion and provide for a
single standard. Over time, however, numerous standards again
developed to deal with specific prisoners’ rights claims. The Court’s
prisoners’ rights jurisprudence culminated in its decision in Beard v.
Banks, upholding a prison policy of depriving prisoners of
constitutional rights to encourage better behavior and promote
rehabilitation.31
This Part outlines the progression of the Court’s prisoners’ rights
jurisprudence by tracing early prisoners’ rights law, examining the
Court’s decision in Turner and the state of prisoners’ rights postTurner, and discussing the cases following Turner that provide the
immediate context for the Court’s decision in Banks.
A. Identifying the Problem: The Pre-Turner Cases
In the Court’s early cases dealing with claims of prisoners’ rights,
the absence of a clear standard and test created a landscape of
jurisprudence which was confusing and difficult to navigate. First, in
32
Procunier v. Martinez, the Court framed the analysis by requiring
the federal courts to take cognizance of prisoners’ constitutional
claims and later explained that “prison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”33
It examined broad prison policies requiring censorship of incoming
and outgoing mail and prohibiting the use of law students and other
paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews.34 Though the
question was framed as whether the First Amendment applied in
prison, the Court found it unnecessary to answer that question
because it found the regulations impinged unconstitutionally on the
35
rights of those not imprisoned. The Court based its decision on
judicial restraint and recognized that courts are ill-equipped to deal
with the complex problems posed by the modern prison system.36 It
31. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2578–79 (plurality opinion).
32. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
33. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84–85 (citing Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404–06).
34. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 398–400.
35. Id. at 408 (“Whatever the status of a prisoner’s claim to uncensored correspondence
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner
correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter . . . .”).
36. Id. at 404–05 (“[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and,
more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require
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noted, however, that “a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass
any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims . . . .
When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to
37
protect constitutional rights.” Thus, it left unresolved the standard of
review for prisoners’ constitutional claims in light of those conflicting
38
interests.
Three other cases attempted to deal with prisoners’ rights issues
within the Martinez framework but failed to create any coherent
39
40
standard. In Pell v. Procunier, the Court upheld a California prison
policy prohibiting face-to-face media interviews with prisoners41 on
the ground that prisoners had alternative ways of exercising their
42
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to communication. In
balancing the interests framed in Martinez, the Court deferred to
prison officials’ judgments regarding prison security and determined
that unless their actions were an exaggerated response to concerns of
prison security, the Court would rely on the expertise of prison
officials in judgments about prison policies.43
44
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., the
Court balanced the need for deference to prison officials when
dealing with urgent problems of prison administration with the fact
that prisoners retain rights not inconsistent with their status as
45
Because allowing the “development of informal
prisoners.
organizations [would] threaten the core functions of prison
administration, maintaining safety and internal security,”46 the Court
in North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union upheld the policy

expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly
within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”).
37. Id. at 405–06.
38. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Martinez did not itself resolve the question that it
framed.”).
39. See id. at 85–89 (discussing the opinions after Martinez leading up to Turner).
40. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
41. Id. at 821–22.
42. Id. at 825–26. The availability of alternative means of exercising the restricted right was
later incorporated into the Turner test. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (“A second factor relevant in
determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction, as Pell shows, is whether there are
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”).
43. Turner, 482 U.S. at 86 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827).
44. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
45. Id. at 129–32.
46. Turner, 482 U.S. at 92 (citing N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 125).
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prohibiting prisoner labor unions and restricting associational rights
as central and therefore rationally related to the objectives of prison
47
administration.
Finally, in Bell v. Wolfish,48 the Court upheld a prison policy
permitting inmates to receive hardcover books only when sent
49
directly from the publisher, book club, or bookstore. Prison
administrators justified this “publisher-only” rule as a means of
avoiding “‘serious’ security and administrative problems.”50 The
Court noted that the restriction was neutral and that the inmates
retained alternative means of exercising their First Amendment
rights.51 Ultimately the Court found this was “a rational response by
prison officials to an obvious security problem,” and absent
prohibitions far more sweeping than those here, the considered
judgment of prison officials would prevail.52
These four cases did not provide a consistent standard to
determine the constitutionality of restrictions on the rights of
prisoners. Though Martinez framed the analysis by requiring a
balance of prisoners’ rights with deference to prison administrators,53
in Pell, North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, and Wolfish, the
Court balanced those interests ad hoc. In each case the deciding
factor was different. In Pell, the constitutionality of the provision
turned on the alternative means available for prisoners to exercise
their rights,54 but in North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, the Court
found the prisoners’ interests were “barely implicated” because the
need for institutional security was so high.55 And finally in Wolfish, it

47. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. at 132–33.
48. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
49. Id. at 550.
50. Id. at 549.
51. Id. at 551–52. As noted, the second prong of the Turner test incorporated the
availability of alternative means of exercising the right. See supra note 42. Similarly, neutrality
was incorporated into the first prong of the Turner test, which requires a “valid, rational
connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586
(1984)). The Court further explained that to satisfy this first prong, “the governmental objective
must be a legitimate and neutral one.” Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
52. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 551.
53. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405–06 (1974).
54. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825–26 (1974).
55. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130–33 (1977)
(“Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to forestall such . . .
threat[s].”).
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was the neutrality and narrowness of the provision that substantiated
56
its constitutionality. It is in this confusing context that Turner v.
Safley was decided, and the Court provided guidance in this area of
law.
B. Turner v. Safley and the Background of Deference to Prison
Administrators
The decision in Turner provided what was to be the sole standard
for prisoners’ rights cases, and the Court has since declared that
future decisions in this area should not render this powerful decision
57
toothless. In Turner, the Supreme Court first formulated the
reasonable relationship test for prisoners’ rights cases—a test that
would later be applied in Banks—and laid the foundation for much of
modern prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.58 Turner involved two prison
policies: a regulation of correspondence between inmates in different
institutions and a regulation severely restricting inmates’ ability to
marry.59 The correspondence regulation permitted communication
with inmates in other institutions only when it was between
immediate family members or when the correspondence concerned
legal matters.60 Otherwise, the regulation prohibited correspondence
unless “the classification/treatment team of each inmate deem[ed] it
61
in the best interest of the parties involved.” The marriage regulation
allowed marriage by an inmate only when approved by the
superintendent of the prison and provided that permission should
only be given when there were compelling reasons to do so.62
The Court’s opinion in Turner outlined four factors to balance in
determining whether a regulation restricting prisoners’ rights is
reasonable:
First, is there a “‘valid rational connection’ between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to

56. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 551–53 (concluding the restriction is “limited,” in part because
of its neutral operation and the alternatives available to prisoners).
57. In Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), the Supreme Court indicated the
importance of Turner by adopting its reasonableness standard and declaring that it is not
“toothless.” Id. at 414.
58. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2577 (2006) (plurality opinion) (declaring Turner
one of the cases containing “the basic substantive legal standards governing this case”).
59. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81–82 (1987).
60. Id. at 81.
61. Id. at 82.
62. Id.
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justify it”? Second, are there “alternative means of exercising the
right that remain open to prison inmates”? Third, what “impact”
will “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right . . . have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally”? And, fourth, are “ready alternatives” for furthering the
63
governmental interest available?

Applying this test, the Court upheld the correspondence
regulation, determining that the regulation reasonably related to
penological interests of security and safety and thus logically
advanced those institutional goals.64 Importantly, this regulation was
65
“not an exaggerated response to those objectives.” In contrast, the
Court struck down the marriage regulation after applying the fourfactor test because it did not reasonably relate to the prison
administration’s goal of rehabilitation and was too broad to serve that
penological objective.66 The Court noted that although the prison
could implement restrictions on the time, place, and manner of
67
inmates’ marriages, it could not categorically ban marriage.
In striking down the marriage restriction and upholding the
correspondence regulation, the Turner Court announced a definite
standard and test for determining the constitutionality of rights
68
restrictions in prisons. In announcing the four-factor balancing test,
the Court established the Turner test as the measure of
constitutionality for regulations restricting the rights of prisoners.

63. Banks, 126 S. Ct at 2578 (plurality opinion) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90)
(internal citations omitted).
64. Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 97–99 (explaining that though rehabilitation was a valid interest, the
provisions were not reasonably related and that the provisions themselves were broader than
the penological objectives stated).
67. See id. (explaining that prisons could certainly regulate the time and circumstances of
the marriage ceremony for legitimate security interests but that the rule banning marriages was
an exaggerated response to security objectives).
68. See id. at 89–91 (articulating the four-factor test). But see Trevor N. McFadden, Note,
When to Turn to Turner? The Supreme Court’s Schizophrenic Prison Jurisprudence, 22 J.L. &
POL. 135, 136 (2006) (arguing that although Turner is nominally the test for prisoners’ rights, it
is not applied in many cases).
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C. Testing the Limits of the Turner Test: The Post-Turner, Pre-Banks
Cases
In case after case, the Court turned to Turner, applying its fourfactor test to numerous questions of prisoners’ rights.69 Though it was
for a time the exclusive test in this area,70 eventually situations began
to arise in which the Turner test was not entirely appropriate even
though the constitutional rights of prisoners were implicated. By
necessity, the test was modified or rejected in those situations.
The Court initially applied the Turner test to religious freedom
situations in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.71 In Estate of Shabazz,
Muslim inmates on work detail outside the prison were prohibited
from returning to the prison during the workday to attend Jumu’ah,
though certain other Muslim observances remained unrestricted.72
The Court applied the Turner test to uphold the policy, finding that it
was justified by institutional security and rehabilitative concerns; the
stringent time requirements for Jumu’ah made it extraordinarily
difficult for prison administrators to ensure that each Muslim could
attend; the Muslim prisoners retained alternative means of free
exercise of their religion; and the accommodation of these inmates
would have adverse effects on other inmates, prison personnel, and
prison resources.73 After the passage of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,74 however, the Court rejected
the Turner test and adopted a compelling government interest
75
standard for Establishment Clause cases as indicated by the statute.

69. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361–62 (1996) (citing Turner); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223–25 (1990) (same); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)
(same); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (same).
70. This point is generally accepted by both courts and academics, but an argument has
been presented that in fact Turner is not the exclusive test for prisoners’ rights claims. See
generally McFadden, supra note 68, at 136 (“In addition to academics, the Supreme Court itself
suggests that Turner created a uniform, single standard of deference to prison
administrators. . . . However, a closer examination of the Court’s jurisprudence shows that this
generalization is simply not true—the Court does not always apply Turner in prison-rights
cases.”).
71. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 348 (explaining that Turner guides the consideration of
religious freedom claims by prisoners).
72. Id. at 345–46.
73. Id. at 350–53.
74. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc).
75. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 & n.11 (2005) (rejecting the use of the
deferential Turner test for the compelling government interest test indicated by the RLUIPA).
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The Court in the procedural due process realm created a test in
76
Sandin v. Conner incompatible with Turner’s reasonable relation
test.77 Conner asks whether the state had created liberty interests
which did not exceed the sentence sufficiently to give rise to a due
process claim by their own force, but “nonetheless impose[d] atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
78
incidents of prison life.” The Court in Conner found that refusing to
allow an inmate to present witnesses at his disciplinary hearing was
not the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which the state
79
might conceivably create a liberty interest and upheld the policy
without engaging in a balancing of the Turner factors or even
mentioning the Turner test.80
Courts have not applied the Turner test to Eighth Amendment
claims.81 Instead, such claims are judged using the “evolving standards
of decency” test, which asks whether the punishment is so
disproportionate that it offends the “evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society,”82 “shocks the
83
conscience,” or is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” If so,
the punishment will be deemed cruel and unusual and thus
unconstitutional.
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claims have also been
judged using a different standard, one developed in McKune v. Lile.84
The Lile test, like the Turner test, asks whether the policy bears a
rational relation to a legitimate penological objective, but then asks
whether the adverse consequences that an inmate faces for not
participating relate to the program objectives and do not constitute
atypical and significant hardships in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.85 Thus for Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claims,

76. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
77. McFadden, supra note 68, at 140, 163–64.
78. Conner, 515 U.S. at 483–84.
79. Id. at 475–76.
80. See id. at 486 (engaging in analysis without mentioning the Turner test).
81. McFadden, supra note 68, at 168.
82. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
83. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002).
85. Id. at 37–38.
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the Court balances prisoners’ interests with valid penological
86
objectives, but does not do so using the Turner test.
Finally, the Court determined that the deferential Turner test
would not apply to the racial segregation of prisoners in Johnson v.
87
88
California and instead applied strict scrutiny. In Johnson, the Court
found unconstitutional a California policy that segregated prisoners
89
on the basis of race while determining their ultimate placements.
The Court accepted the rationale of the dissenters on the Court of
Appeals, that Turner is inapplicable when “the right asserted is not
inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives,”90 by applying the
far less deferential strict scrutiny standard and striking down the
91
policy.
Though the Court rejected the Turner test in Conner, Lile, and
Johnson, and Congress mandated a compelling interest test instead of
the Turner test in free exercise cases, Turner was well established as
the standard for other First Amendment claims. But whether the
Turner test would apply when a First Amendment rights deprivation
was itself justified by prison administrators primarily as an
encouragement of rehabilitation had not been challenged. The Court
decided the proper test for deciding prisoners’ constitutional claims in
precisely this context in Banks.
II. THE FACTS AND DECISION OF BEARD V. BANKS
In Beard v. Banks, a case brought by an inmate in Pennsylvania,
the Supreme Court reevaluated the limits of First Amendment rights
in prison.92 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania houses its most
difficult prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU), which

86. Id. at 36–37.
87. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
88. Id. at 512.
89. Id. at 502–03.
90. Id. at 505 (“Judge Ferguson, joined by three others, dissented on grounds that ‘[t]he
panel’s decision ignore[d] the Supreme Court’s repeated and unequivocal command that all
racial classifications imposed by the government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny, and fail[ed] to recognize that [the] Turner analysis is inapplicable in cases, such as
this one, in which the right asserted is not inconsistent with legitimate penological objectives.’”);
see id. at 510–12 (“The right not to be discriminated against on one’s race is not susceptible to
the logic of Turner.”).
91. Id. at 509–10, 512.
92. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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is reserved for the “most incorrigible, recalcitrant inmates.” All
inmates in the LTSU are initially assigned to the most restrictive
“level 2,”94 where they “have no access to the commissary, they may
have only one visitor per month (an immediate family member), and
95
they are not allowed phone calls except in emergencies.” They also
have no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs,
though they are allowed personal and legal correspondence, religious
and legal materials, two library books, and writing paper.96
Inmate Ronald Banks filed an action alleging that the “level 2
Policy forbidding inmates all access to newspapers, magazines, and
photographs bears no reasonable relation to any legitimate
penological objective and consequently violates the First
97
Amendment.”
Justice Breyer wrote for the plurality to reverse the Third
Circuit’s judgment that the regulation could not be supported as a
matter of law and uphold the Pennsylvania LTSU-2 policy prohibiting
98
any access to newspapers, magazines, or photographs for inmates.
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined
by Justice Scalia, creating the necessary majority to uphold the law.99
Justice Ginsburg dissented and also joined in a dissent written by
100
Justice Stevens, while Justice Alito, who wrote the Third Circuit
dissenting opinion,101 did not participate.102
The multiple opinions in this case reflect the Justices’ different
positions on the appropriate level of deference to give prison officials
in First Amendment cases. Though a majority of the Court decided
the case solely on the basis of the first Turner factor, dismissing the
other three factors and thereby the balancing process demanded by

93. Id. at 2576.
94. Id. Inmates in LTSU-2 have the possibility of graduating to somewhat less restrictive
level 1 at the discretion of prison administrators after the first ninety days, but most of the forty
inmates in LTSU remained in level 2 when Banks was decided. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Restrictions on prisoners in LTSU-1 are only slightly decreased; they may receive
one newspaper and five magazines, though personal photographs are still prohibited. Id. at
2576–77.
97. Id. at 2577.
98. Id. at 2581–82.
99. Id. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. Id. at 2585 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2591 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 148–50 (3d Cir. 2005) (Alito, J., dissenting).
102. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2582.
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103
their presence, the Court’s opinions evince three distinct levels of
deference to prison administrators.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Breyer found the deprivation of
newspapers and magazines a significant incentive to improve
104
behavior, thus satisfying the first of the Turner factors. The plurality
found that an analysis of the other factors added little to the
105
determination acquired from the first factor. Because there was a
“valid rational connection between the prison regulation and the
106
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it” —the first
of the Turner factors—the regulation was reasonable.107 Thus, the
ultimate determination of the Turner test was made after considering
108
only one factor. This essentially changed the test from requiring a
reasonable relationship to requiring a rational relationship.109

103. See id. at 2579 (plurality opinion) (applying the first factor alone of the Turner test); id.
at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
104. Id. at 2579 (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 2580.
106. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
107. See id. at 2578–79 (“[W]e believe that the first rationale itself satisfies Turner’s
requirements. . . . [T]he statement and deposition set forth a ‘valid, rational connection’
between the Policy and ‘legitimate penological objectives.’” (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89,
95)).
108. Id. The unwieldy application of the final three factors of the test in deprivation for
rehabilitation situations is evident through an examination of each prong. The second factor
asks whether “alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”
exist. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90). Justice Stevens explained that, “under the
deprivation theory of rehabilitation, there could never be a ‘ready alternative’ for furthering the
government interest, because the government interest is tied directly to depriving the prisoner
of the constitutional right at issue.” Id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore the second
factor is clearly inapplicable in deprivation for rehabilitation situations. The third factor, the
“impact . . . accommodation of the asserted constitutional right . . . [will] have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally,” id. at 2578 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90), is not necessarily implicated in the deprivation for
rehabilitation situation because the purpose of the deprivation is not affected by the ease with
which the right could be provided. The fourth factor, whether there are “ready alternatives”
available for furthering the governmental interest, id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90), could be
useful in determining the reasonableness of the deprivation. For instance, when prisoners have
not been deprived of other privileges and when alternative deprivation remains available,
deprivation of constitutional rights would be more likely to be deemed unreasonable. In fact,
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania made the argument that the previous removal of all other
rights and privileges indicated the policy’s necessity to encourage good behavior. Id. at 2579.
109. For a discussion of the modification of the Turner test, see supra Part I.C. The change
from the word “reasonable” to the word “rational” is not necessarily significant here. Instead, it
is the change of the test indicated by the change of language that is important. A rational
relationship requires that a prison regulation be justified in a valid, rational way by a legitimate
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The plurality opinion explained that the Third Circuit gave too
little deference to the deputy superintendent’s claim that the LTSU-2
program created significant behavioral incentives for particularly
110
difficult inmates. Thus, in applying the test, the plurality gave
“substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison
administrators[,]”111 recognizing that “the Constitution sometimes
permits greater restriction of [constitutional] rights in a prison than it
112
would allow elsewhere.” The plurality explained that although it did
not accord deference for disputed facts, the views of prison
authorities in matters of professional judgment received such
deference.113 In practice, however, the plurality did not look beyond
the justifications given by the secretary of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections to determine whether those justifications
were in fact adequate or were instead exaggerated responses to the
state’s objective, as the Court did in Turner.114 The plurality found the
views of the deputy superintendent to be sufficient evidence that the
115
regulations “do, in fact, serve the function identified.” Based on this
evidence alone, the plurality found the first factor—the only factor it
116
In sum, the
considered, and thus the entire test—satisfied.
deference given by the plurality counted the opinions of prison
administrators as adequate evidence in favor of the policy and would
have required evidence contradicting those opinions to avoid
summary judgment.117

government interest. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90 (explaining that a rational connection must
not render the policy “arbitrary or irrational” and that the government interest must be “a
legitimate and neutral one”). A reasonable relationship requires that this rational relationship
be balanced with the three other Turner factors. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–91 (describing the
four factors relevant in determining the reasonableness of a regulation). This distinction evinces
the change of test that is essential to the analysis of this Note.
110. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2581 (plurality opinion).
111. See id. at 2578 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003)) (stating the
standard of deference in prisoners’ constitutional rights cases).
112. Id. at 2577–78.
113. Id. at 2579.
114. See id. at 2578–79 (explaining that the Secretary gave justifications and they were
therefore adequate).
115. Id. at 2579.
116. See id. (explaining that the statements satisfy the first factor and support the policy’s
reasonableness).
117. Id. at 2580. This is true despite the fact that Justice Breyer also emphasized that the
deference owed to prison officials is not so high that it is impossible for prisoners to challenge a
regulation. Id. at 2581.
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The level of deference granted by the plurality is best understood
against the background of the level given by the concurrence. Instead
of applying only a single factor like the plurality and dissent, Justice
118
Thomas in his concurrence jettisoned the Turner factors altogether.
He instead analyzed the case using his own standard of deference,
opining that deference to prison administrators should extend to the
119
limits of the Eighth Amendment. He argued that the Constitution
grants states and prison officials the ability to define and redefine
punishment and incarceration up to the limit of cruel and unusual
120
punishment set by the Eighth Amendment. His approach flatly
rejects the Turner test in favor of absolute deference to prison
administrators. Rather than assuming that “[p]rison walls do not form
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution,”121 the concurrence presumed that it is the state’s
prerogative to determine when sentences include the extinction of
122
From this premise, the concurrence
constitutional rights.
determined that prisoners are not entitled to any rights beyond those
provided in the Eighth Amendment because states are free to define
and redefine punishment to include various types of deprivations
regardless of whether they extinguish constitutional rights in the
process.123 This deference exceeds the grant of deference by the

118. See id. at 2582 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Both the plurality and the
dissent evaluate the regulations challenged in this case pursuant to the approach set forth in
Turner v. Safley, which permits prison regulations that ‘imping[e] on inmates’ constitutional
rights’ if the regulations are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” (citations
omitted)).
119. Id. at 2582–83. Justice Thomas first articulated this standard in his concurrence in
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), which involved the Michigan prison policy limiting the
total number of visitors inmates could receive and placing restrictions on who those visitors
could be. Id. at 129–30. He argued that the policy was constitutional because the prisoners’
lawful sentence removed a right enjoyed by free persons, not because it withstood the Turner
test, as the majority held. Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). He explained that
the majority’s position rested on the erroneous assumption “that the Constitution contains an
implicit definition of incarceration” and that the proper view was instead that “[s]tates are free
to define and redefine all types of punishment, including imprisonment, to encompass various
types of deprivations—provided only that those deprivations are consistent with the Eighth
Amendment.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
120. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Bazzetta,
539 U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)).
121. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
122. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
123. Id. at 2582–83.
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124

plurality and grants absolute deference to states and prison officials
to entirely eliminate constitutional rights with only the Eighth
Amendment as a limit.125
In their dissents, both Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg
approached the regulation, like the plurality, through the lens of
Turner.126 Although Justice Stevens evaluated the policy to determine
whether it reasonably connected to the penological interest of
rehabilitation, writing in dissent for both himself and Justice Ginsburg
he also focused on an additional aspect of the Turner test: that an
exaggerated response to a legitimate penological objective cannot
withstand scrutiny.127 This approach assumes prisoners retain some
constitutional protection beyond merely that of the Eighth
128
Amendment. The dissenters granted a level of deference distinct
from that of both the plurality and the concurrence. They gave less
deference to prison administrators’ justifications in their examination
of whether the challenged deprivations were exaggerated responses
to a prison’s legitimate interest in rehabilitation.129 Both Justice
Stevens and Justice Ginsburg determined that a reasonable factfinder
could conclude the responses were exaggerated, and thus the “prison
officials [were] not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”130 Neither
dissenter found the justifications given by prison administrators to be
such strong evidence that the prisoner was required to refute the
justifications for the case to go to trial.131 Instead, they agreed that the
opinions of prison administrators alone were not enough to grant
summary judgment and explained that under the plurality’s analysis
124. As discussed supra, the plurality counted as evidence the opinions of prison officials
about particular prison policies limiting constitutional rights beyond what would be permissible
for those who are not incarcerated. See id. at 2578 (plurality opinion) (“[O]ur inferences must
accord deference to the views of prison authorities.”).
125. Id. at 2583 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. Id. at 2585 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2585 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 2585–91 (scrutinizing the justifications of prison administrators and finding
the regulations to be an exaggerated response to the valid penological objective of
rehabilitation).
130. Id. at 2588–89; accord id. at 2593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 2589 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that evidence contradicting the
opinions of the prison authorities is precisely the kind of evidence that might have been
presented at trial); see also id. at 2592–93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that deference
should only be granted after the facts shown are viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, thus implying that this stage of litigation is not the most appropriate for
granting deference).
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any deprivation would be upheld as a way to improve behavior due to
132
the level of deference given to prison officials.
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent focused on the
133
procedural stage of the case before the Court. She argued that even
if the deference given by the plurality was appropriate, it was
inappropriate at summary judgment, the stage of litigation in
question.134 She took issue with the plurality’s recognition that the
summary judgment standard requires the Court to “draw ‘all
justifiable inferences’” in favor of Banks, but did so only after first
according deference to prison authorities on “disputed matters of
professional judgment.”135 Ginsburg’s dissent explained that
“deference should come into play, pretrial, only after the facts shown
are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all
inferences are drawn in that party’s favor.”136 Ginsburg ultimately
found on the basis of the record that “‘the logical connection between
the . . . regulation and the asserted goal’ could be found by a
reasonable trier to be ‘so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
137
irrational.’”
The variation in deference given by the Justices provides an
important distinction in the application of the Turner test. The
concurring argument for absolute deference stands in stark contrast
to the dissenters’ approach of inquiring whether the regulation is an
exaggerated response to a valid penological objective before granting
summary judgment. The plurality granted higher deference to prison
administrators than required by precedent through its elimination of
three of the Turner factors. Which of these approaches should lower
courts adopt? And even more importantly, how does the Court’s
decision in Banks affect the theory of incarceration implicitly adopted
by the Court?

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 2588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2591–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2592–93 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2592.
Id. at 2592–93.
Id. at 2593 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987)).
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III. RECONCILING BANKS WITH A THEORY OF PROPER
INCARCERATION
Given the multiple levels of deference granted by the Justices,
determining how lower courts should interpret the Banks opinion
consistently with precedent becomes a difficult task. This Note argues
that the best approach combines the consolidation of the Turner test
by most of the Court with the dissenters’ emphasis on ensuring that
prison officials’ justifications for deprivations are not exaggerated
responses to real and intractable problems faced by prison
administration. This Part discerns a theory of proper incarceration to
facilitate a deference analysis for lower courts and finds that a theory
of proper incarceration is already present in the Court’s
jurisprudence. Thus, though a theory may be necessary, it would not
require a new creation. It then deconstructs Banks and chooses from
among the opinions a standard that is consistent with this theory of
proper incarceration to apply in future prisoners’ rights cases.
A. The Court’s Theory of Proper Incarceration
At least one scholar has argued that the Court in Banks chose to
eliminate meaningful judicial review of prisoners’ rights restrictions to
avoid crafting a theory or definition of proper incarceration.138 But
what is a theory of proper incarceration, and what would indicate
whether the Court has chosen to craft one? A theory of proper
incarceration is simply “what a proper prison ought to look like and
how it ought to be administered.”139
According to Justice Thomas, for the Court to analyze which
restrictions on rights in prison are constitutional it must necessarily
adopt such a theory or definition.140 He explained, “The Court’s
precedents on the rights of prisoners rest on the unstated (and
erroneous) presumption that the Constitution contains an implicit
141
definition of incarceration.” And when a right “need necessarily be
compromised for the sake of proper prison administration” it is
inconsistent with proper incarceration.142 Justice Thomas explained

138.
(2006).
139.
140.
141.
142.

The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 125, 263–73
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 541–42 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.; Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 139 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that “[t]his inconsistency-with-proper-prison-administration test begs
the question . . . . For a court to know whether any particular right is
inconsistent with proper prison administration, it must have some
implicit notion of what a proper prison ought to look like and how it
143
ought to be administered.” Thus a theory of proper incarceration is
simply a definition of constitutional incarceration. Assuming Justice
Thomas is correct, the Court’s extensive prisoners’ rights
jurisprudence and its determinations about which rights are
compatible with proper incarceration indicate that it has at least
144
implicitly adopted such a theory.
The theory of proper incarceration the Court has implicitly
created comes from its prisoners’ rights jurisprudence. Through
previous cases, the Court has determined that prison walls do not
keep out the protections of the Constitution, even though
145
constitutional rights may be restricted when necessary. Further, the
Court has determined that those rights which are not inconsistent
with proper incarceration remain wholly intact and may not be
infringed even in prison,146 and that constitutional rights may be
limited for security purposes when on balance the restrictions are
reasonably related to valid penological objectives.147
Thus, even if a theory of proper incarceration must exist before
the Court can meaningfully review prison policies, previous decisions
have already established many features of that theory. The structure
of the theory was set in pre-Turner cases such as Martinez, in which
the Court explained that the two ultimate factors to be balanced in
prisoners’ rights cases were the need to protect constitutional rights
retained by prisoners and the need for the courts to exercise restraint
and defer to prison administrators when dealing with the complex and

143. Id. at 541–42.
144. See Bazzetta, 539 U.S. at 139 (arguing that the Court has adopted such a theory);
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 541 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); see also Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct.
2572, 2575–82 (2006) (plurality opinion) (deciding the extent to which First Amendment rights
are retained in prison); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36–38 (2002) (deciding the extent to which
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination are retained in prison); Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 477–87 (1995) (deciding the extent to which due process rights are retained in prison);
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–53 (1987) (deciding the extent to which free
exercise rights are retained in prison).
145. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989).
146. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510.
147. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).
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148
intractable problems of American prisons. Turner built on this
structure and set out the framework to evaluate rights-deprivation
situations in which prison administrators could receive substantial
deference while still allowing substantive judicial review for the
protection of prisoners’ rights.149
Similarly, Johnson set out a framework for use when the rights at
150
issue are not inconsistent with proper incarceration. Though the
Court in Johnson did not define “proper incarceration” explicitly,151 it
illuminated some aspects of what constitutes proper incarceration
through its decision. By finding equal protection not inconsistent with
proper incarceration, it implied that proper incarceration includes
152
equal protection rights. The framework of Fifth and Eighth
Amendment rights restrictions as well as procedural due process
claims, which were decided outside the Turner context and thus are
inapplicable to First Amendment situations, also illuminate the
theory.153 Turner’s analytical framework failed in Banks because the
deprivation for rehabilitation justification did not map well within the
Turner framework. The right in question was not a Fifth Amendment,
Eighth Amendment, or due process right, nor so obviously
compatible with the vision of proper incarceration alluded to by the
Court in Johnson that the Johnson framework became applicable.
Thus the Court was required to further develop its burgeoning theory
of proper incarceration in Banks.
Because case law is necessarily reactive rather than proactive, allencompassing theories and frameworks often develop in segmented
ways in response to the needs posed by particular cases rather than in
a comprehensive fashion. Thus, any decision evaluating the level of
constitutional protection granted to prisoners would have further
developed the Court’s theory of proper incarceration. Even refusing

148. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 424–28 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
149. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (“Our task, then, as we stated in Martinez, is to formulate a
standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is responsive both to the ‘policy of
judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional
rights.’”).
150. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
151. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 267–68.
152. See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510 (“It is not a right that need necessarily be compromised
for the sake of proper prison administration.”).
153. See generally McFadden, supra note 68 (describing the different analyses that courts
have used for prisoners’ rights claims outside the Turner context).
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the existence of constitutional protections beyond the Eighth
Amendment—a theory much different than one that balances
prisoners’ rights with penological goals—further develops the theory.
The Court’s development of this theory in Banks ultimately included
a modification of the Turner test in deprivation for rehabilitation
situations, despite the fact that the Court did not make this
154
modification expressly. Not only does this modification further
develop the preexisting theory of incarceration, but it also shows that
accommodating deprivation for rehabilitation situations within its
preexisting theory of incarceration was not problematic for the Court.
Because it had already developed many details of the theory of
incarceration, the Court in Banks did not need to create a theory out
155
of “whole cloth.” In fact, the only necessary development of the
theory in Banks was the level of deference given to prison officials’
justifications for restricting constitutional rights in the name of
rehabilitation. Furthermore, any decision on the level of deference
applicable in rehabilitation situations adds to the developing theory
of “proper incarceration.” As such, rather than the Court being
forced to choose either to retain meaningful judicial review or to
create a new theory from “whole cloth,” only determining which
deference level was most appropriate became essential to filling in the
details of the theory of incarceration already accepted by the Court.
B. The Appropriate Test and Level of Deference
Because the Court in Banks only needed to further develop the
theory of proper incarceration by deciding the appropriate level of
deference to be granted when prison officials justify their actions as
promoting rehabilitation, this Note turns to distilling the proper level
of deference post-Banks from multiple opinions, precedent, and
policy.
Though there was no majority opinion, a majority of the Court
agreed on the proper test to determine whether regulations were
156
valid restrictions of prisoners’ rights. Over half of the Justices
157
implemented a test that eliminated three of the Turner factors, thus

154. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2579 (2006) (plurality opinion) (applying only the
first of the Turner factors).
155. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 269.
156. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579 (plurality opinion) (applying only the first factor of the
Turner test); id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same).
157. Id. at 2579 (plurality opinion); id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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further developing the theory of proper incarceration by altering the
way the Court decided the extent to which First Amendment rights
158
were retained in prison. To avoid rendering Turner toothless when
the Court does not rely on all four factors, it must make a new
formulation to balance the interests of prisoners with deference to
prison administrators. The plurality nominally kept the same level of
deference—not entire deference, but definite reliance on the
justifications of prison administrators—without accounting for the
loss of teeth due to the absence of the other factors,159 thus effectively
increasing deference to the prison administrators. The approach of
the dissenters, however, presented a way to account for that loss by
replacing the eliminated factors with Turner’s requirement that the
regulation not be an exaggerated response to the penological
objective.160 The concurrence, in contrast, rejected any balancing
whatsoever and instead favored deference over judicial review,
161
endorsing absolute deference to prison officials. The level of
deference granted to prison administrators will not only determine
the outcome of most cases, it will also ultimately determine whether
courts continue to engage in meaningful judicial review of prison
policies. The next Sections further explore the issues of deference and
judicial review.
1. Absolute Deference is Not the Proper Standard. The Court’s
long observance that prisoners retain constitutional rights cannot be
reconciled with the position taken by Justice Thomas’s concurrence—
that prisoners retain no rights beyond those granted in the Eighth
Amendment—or with the plurality’s implicit movement toward that
position.162 Thus those approaches should be rejected. The
concurrence’s position should also be rejected on the ground that it
eliminates meaningful judicial review in situations dealing with the
fundamental rights of discrete and insular minorities, disenfranchised
prisoners, and former prisoners. Finally, with the elimination of
meaningful judicial review of prison policies, the accountability of
158. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989) (“We adopt the Turner standard in
this case with confidence that . . . ‘a reasonableness standard is not toothless.’”).
159. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2575–82 (plurality opinion) (analyzing the regulation at issue
under one of the four Turner factors, but not adding anything additional to the test).
160. See id. at 2588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing the regulation to determine
whether it is an exaggerated response to a valid penological objective).
161. Id. at 2582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
162. See supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text.

08__WIMSATT.DOC

2008]

4/16/2008 8:42:31 AM

PRISONERS’ RIGHTS

1233

prison officials would decrease, possibly leading to greater abuses of
their power, reflecting yet another reason absolute deference to
prison administrators is improper.
The Court has repeatedly held that incarcerated individuals are
still entitled to constitutional protections even though those
protections may be limited.163 Despite precedent to the contrary,
Justice Thomas continued to argue that the Constitution, apart from
the Eighth Amendment, does not apply in prison.164 Given the longstanding precedent accepting that constitutional rights are retained in
prison, for the Court to move toward the theory of constitutional
rights advocated by Justice Thomas in his concurrence, it would have
to overturn, abrogate, or at least undermine countless holdings to the
contrary. Although by eliminating three factors of the Turner test the
Court may have taken a tentative implicit step toward the doctrine
advocated by Justice Thomas,165 it did not, and does not seem likely
to, explicitly reject years of precedent proclaiming precisely the
opposite of that interpretation.
In addition to its sharp departure from precedent, the
concurrence’s approach is undesirable because it effectively
eliminates meaningful judicial review of prison policies. There are
several compelling arguments for strong judicial review of, and thus
less deference to, prison policies restricting the rights of prisoners.
First, meaningful judicial review is justified because prisoners lack
political power and are often disenfranchised, rendering them a
“discrete and insular minority.”166 Under the philosophy announced in
167
United States v. Carolene Products Co., regulations that discriminate
against “discrete and insular minorities” may require a “more
searching judicial inquiry.”168 Discrete and insular minorities are those

163. See, e.g., Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2577–78 (plurality opinion) (“This Court recognized in
Turner that imprisonment does not automatically deprive a prisoner of certain important
constitutional protections, including those of the First Amendment. But at the same time the
Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such rights in a prison than it would allow
elsewhere.” (citations omitted)); see also supra notes 13–20 and accompanying text.
164. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
165. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 267 (“[T]he
plurality subtly but surely took a large step toward the approach adopted by Justice
Thomas . . . .”).
166. Gieger, supra note 2, at 1208.
167. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
168. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4; see Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459 (“As
the Court has noted, ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ is appropriate when it is a law that
interferes with individual rights, or a law that restricts the ability of the political process to
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that are unlikely to rely on the political process for adequate
169
protection. Incarcerated criminal offenders fit this classic definition
because they “constitute a despised minority without political power
170
to influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.”
Scholars have deemed prisoners to be “the least sympathetic group of
‘outsiders’ in our constitutional jurisprudence.”171 Because according
to Carolene Products the Equal Protection Clause is meant to protect
those to whom the political process is useless and criminal offenders
are viewed as second-class citizens, legislation that places further
burdens on this already marginalized group should be viewed with
strict scrutiny.172
Nevertheless, “to many people, inmates are unworthy of
173
concern,” and “[l]ower federal courts have uniformly rejected
heightened protection for inmates.”174 Offenders are only protected
175
from legislation with no conceivable rational basis. This position
may stem from the fact that, though prisoners are a discrete and
insular minority, they are “a minority that has earned its despised
status by causing harm to society.”176 Yet “[t]he words of the Bill of
Rights provide a basis for judicial scrutiny of government policies that
infringe on individuals’ rights—even if the individuals in question
have earned their despised status.”177 Therefore even if prisoners are
repeal undesirable legislation, [or] a law that discriminates against a ‘discrete and insular
minority.’”); Gieger, supra note 2, at 1208 (“Justice Stone thus suggested [in Carolene Products]
that where groups are repeat losers in pluralist politics not because of their minority status in a
majoritarian democracy but because of prejudice, the judiciary may set aside its traditional
deference towards legislation and more rigorously review it.”).
169. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459. In addition to the discrete and insular minority
composed of all prisoners, the incarcerated individuals making up the prison population are
primarily members of larger discrete and insular minorities. See James E. Robertson, Supreme
Court Review: Foreword: “Separate but Equal” in Prison: Johnson v. California and Common
Sense Racism, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 843 (2006) (“At the close of 2004, white
inmates comprised thirty-four percent of all federal and state male prisoners serving sentences
of longer than one year.”). In fact, the “prison functions as a ‘peculiar institution’ by excluding
large numbers of black offenders from the mainstream economic, political, and social life of the
nation.” Id. at 844.
170. SMITH, supra note 21, at 292.
171. Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun
and the Outsiders, 71 N.D. L. REV. 173, 176 (1995); accord Robertson, supra note 23, at 203.
172. Gieger, supra note 2, at 1241–42.
173. Robertson, supra note 23, at 203.
174. Id. at 201.
175. Gieger, supra note 2, at 1242.
176. SMITH, supra note 21, at 292.
177. Id.
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unworthy of greater protection, higher judicial scrutiny under
Carolene Products is appropriate when the rights in question are
178
fundamental constitutional rights.
Because prisoners lack political recourse to the other branches of
government and the rights in question are fundamental rights, stricter
judicial review should apply in prisoners’ rights situations in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Carolene
Products.179 Moreover, eliminating meaningful judicial review creates
a situation where “[t]he protections provided by the United States
180
Constitution apply least where they are needed the most.”
A related argument contends that meaningful judicial review is
181
necessary to increase accountability of prison officials. Because
political mechanisms tend to be inadequate tools for prisoners, strong
judicial review would promote both “accountability and the efficacy
of prison policies.”182 Prison officials, though they possess unique
knowledge of complex prison systems, are the very individuals who
183
have incentive to justify harsh policies and hide individual abuses.
Though prisons serve an enforcement function and should already be
accountable to the executive, the ability of prisoners to petition the
courts, and the ability of the courts to review policies without
automatically deferring to the justifications of prison administrators,
provides an opportunity for courts to ensure that prison officials
remain accountable.184

178. The Court in Carolene Products established that restrictions of fundamental rights, as
well as those that discriminate against discrete and insular minorities, may be subject to a more
searching judicial inquiry. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–153 n.4.
(1938); see Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 459 (“As the Court has noted, ‘more searching
judicial inquiry’ is appropriate when it is a law that interferes with individual rights . . . . The
violations of basic constitutional rights by authoritarian institutions fits [sic] exactly within the
areas where the Carolene Products footnote justifies heightened review.”).
179. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 461 (“The current presumption is against judicial
review when there is a claim that an authoritarian institution has violated a person’s rights. This
assumption is backwards of what it should be. The judiciary should operate from the premise
that it has a special role in protecting individuals in these institutions.”).
180. Id. at 441.
181. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 272.
182. Id.
183. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 458 (“[W]hen people are given authority over
others abuses are likely to occur.”).
184. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 273 (“[Federal
courts] then should focus on promoting accountability for increasingly severe restrictions on
constitutionally protected rights.”).
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Finally, the concurrence’s approach should be rejected because
the disproportionate power it gives prison administrators will likely
lead to abuse. At least one legal scholar has argued that the very
185
nature of authoritarian institutions leads to abuses. Various social
science evidence has indicated that “the greater authority some have
over others, and the fewer the checks or limits on behavior, the
186
greater the chance for abuse.” This greater likelihood of serious
abuses in such authoritarian situations provides greater necessity for
judicial review and involvement.187 Giving extreme deference to the
opinions of the very individuals with reason to justify harsh
regulations—the prison administrators who adopted the policy in the
first place and are inclined to value order in their prisons above the
welfare of individual inmates—would merely exacerbate this problem
and eliminate the already extremely limited ability of prisoners to
make a case of constitutional infringement.188 Because the potential
for abuse is already present and granting additional deference to
prison administrators would increase this risk of abuse, courts should
continue to meaningfully review prisoner rights claims.
Thus, the concurrence’s position of absolute deference should be
rejected for at least four independent reasons. First, it is inconsistent
with countless precedent, which established that prisoners retain
constitutional rights. Second, under Carolene Products prisoners are a
discrete and insular minority that should receive greater, not less,
judicial review of policies discriminating against them. Even if
prisoners are not worthy of such greater protection, when the rights in
question are fundamental, their restriction should still be subject to
stricter scrutiny. Third, meaningful judicial review increases the
accountability of prison administrators. Finally, meaningful judicial

185. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 441–42 (“[T]hese are the places where judicial
review is most essential. Because of the very nature of these institutions, serious abuses of basic
rights can occur. . . . Unfortunately, individuals in these institutions generally have nowhere else
to turn for protection.”).
186. Id. at 458.
187. Id. The Court has not accepted this argument and has been reluctant to get involved
with prisons because of the perceived dangers of becoming embroiled in complex prison
administration problems. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2582 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (describing what he believes to be the “least perilous approach for
resolving challenges to prison regulations”).
188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 450 (describing how the Court ignored potential
incentives on the part of prison administrators in a case involving the ability of prisoners to be
free from forced injections of powerful antipsychotic medications).

08__WIMSATT.DOC

2008]

4/16/2008 8:42:31 AM

PRISONERS’ RIGHTS

1237

review can lessen the abuses characteristic of authoritarian
institutions.
2. Movement toward Absolute Deference is Also Inappropriate.
By simply eliminating the other Turner factors instead of modifying
the balancing test, the plurality has given something resembling the
189
concurrence’s absolute deference to prison administrators. Because
absolute deference is inappropriate, eliminating factors of the
balancing test to give nearly absolute deference to prison
administrators under the guise of granting the same deference
previously afforded under Turner must also be inappropriate. Thus, a
greater modification of the test is necessary.
Though the Turner test is ostensibly the sole test for prisoners’
rights claims,190 in Banks both the plurality and dissenters determined
the constitutionality of the prison regulation based solely on the first
191
of the Turner factors. They therefore abridged the Turner test to
consist of only one factor in deprivation for rehabilitation situations.192
This factor asks whether there is a there a “valid rational connection”
between the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest
put forward to justify it.193 When the Court only uses this first factor
without any balancing of the other three factors, the test effectively
changes from whether the policy reasonably relates to a legitimate
penological objective to simply whether this first factor is met.
The problem with this application is that by establishing a fourfactor test in Turner to determine what reasonably relates to a valid
penological objective, the Court implicitly found that a “reasonable
relation” to a valid penological objective was not the equivalent of a
“valid rational connection.”194 Because reading the first Turner factor
as merely restating, clarifying, or illuminating the nature of what is a
reasonable relation would negate the purpose of the other three
factors and thus conflate a valid rational connection with a reasonable

189. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 268.
190. McFadden, supra note 68, at 136.
191. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2579 (plurality opinion) (“The second, third, and fourth factors . . .
here add little, one way or another, to the first factor’s basic logical rationale.”); id. at 2588
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his deprivation theory does not map easily onto several of the
Turner factors . . . .”).
192. Id. at 2580 (plurality opinion).
193. Id. at 2578 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
194. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90 (establishing that four factors are relevant in determining
the reasonableness of the policy in question).

08__WIMSATT.DOC

1238

4/16/2008 8:42:31 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1209

relationship to a valid penological objective, this reading must be
inappropriate. The other factors must add something necessary to the
analysis. If the other factors are necessary to the analysis, their
removal without replacement must not only change the nature of the
test, but implicitly must cause the application of the test to no longer
determine what is reasonably related and therefore no longer be an
appropriate formula for determining what passes constitutional
muster. The plurality’s elimination of the balancing indicated by the
other factors while continuing to grant deference to prison
administrators necessarily moves the standard toward the absolute
deference granted by the concurrence.
An additional aspect of the Court’s incarceration jurisprudence
reflects the inappropriateness of this movement. The Turner Court
itself dealt with a deprivation for rehabilitation situation and did not
merely accept the justifications of prison officials without further
195
inquiring into the likelihood that they were in fact correct. Though
one of the regulations examined in Turner dealt with a security
justification—the kind of justification courts have had no problem
tracing through the Turner factors—the other regulation was of the
same type dealt with in Banks: a deprivation of privileges for
rehabilitative purposes.196 In Turner, the Court found assertions by
prison administrators that the regulation was in fact rehabilitative to
be inadequate to withstand scrutiny.197 It did not give greater
deference through the application of only one factor to the prison
198
administrators’ justification that the policy was rehabilitative. It also
did not cite to or seem to rely on evidence presented by the prisoner
199
to the contrary —as the Banks plurality opinion suggested was
necessary to survive summary judgment.200 Instead, the Turner Court

195. See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 272 (“In
invalidating the ban on inmate marriages, the Turner Court did not defer unquestioningly to the
prison administration’s determination of the rehabilitative benefits.”).
196. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 81–82 (explaining the two regulations at issue).
197. See id. at 99 (“[W]e note that on this record the rehabilitative objective asserted to
support the regulation itself is suspect.”).
198. See id. (“[T]he almost complete ban on the decision to marry is not reasonably related
to legitimate penological objectives. We conclude, therefore, that the Missouri marriage
regulation is facially invalid.”).
199. See id. at 94–99 (disposing of the marriage regulation without mentioning or citing to
any evidence presented by the prisoners).
200. Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2581–82 (2006) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that
“prisoners or others attacking a prison policy” may survive summary judgment by presenting
“substantial evidence that . . . the [p]olicy is not a reasonable one”).
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used its own reasoning to question the relationship between the
201
regulation and the asserted penological objective. This example set
in Turner prescribes how the Court should proceed in evaluating
deprivation for rehabilitation claims and shows that anything
resembling absolute deference is inappropriate.
The plurality effectively removed the teeth from the Turner test
by relying on and deferring to the justifications given by prison
202
administrators for prison policy. Following the plurality opinion, the
scrutiny given to prison policies turns entirely on the justifications for
a policy given by the prison administrators. Thus, if a policy is
justified by security needs, all four Turner factors will apply. If instead
the administrators choose to justify the policy through rehabilitation
needs alone, only one factor of the Turner test will apply, and the
policy will face less strict scrutiny.203 Using the plurality’s reasoning,
any deprivation of constitutional interest could be justified as
“rehabilitative” because it would encourage inmates to behave better
in order to regain their constitutional rights.204 Therefore the practical
effects of the plurality’s reasoning are essentially the same as if it had
wholly adopted the concurrence’s approach, that is, “prison officials
from now on will be able to abridge constitutionally protected rights
205
‘merely by reciting talismanic incantations’ of rehabilitation.”
Though the approaches implemented by the concurrence and the
plurality should not be adopted, justifications for stricter review must
still be balanced with the need for discipline, the preservation of
order, and the unique knowledge possessed by prison officials
206
regarding prison administration. These interests can be reconciled
when courts give deference to prison officials by looking to their
justifications and judgments for guidance, but balance those
justifications with the nature and quality of the right restricted and
closely examine the connection between the regulation and the stated
penological objective. An increase in the burden of production placed

201. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 98–99 (explaining that there was not enough evidence on the
record to show that the restriction was reasonably related to the stated goal).
202. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 268.
203. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the justification
accepted by the plurality has no limiting principle).
204. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 268.
205. Id. (quoting The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137,
245 (1989)).
206. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 460 (acknowledging the importance of discipline
and order in authoritarian institutions).
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upon prison administrators “would hopefully lead to better-supported
207
policies and help eliminate hunch-based regulations.” The Turner
majority’s analysis of the marriage restriction—deferring to the prison
administration’s claim of rehabilitative benefits but not doing so
unquestioningly—reflects this type of balancing and inquiry into the
quality of the connection.208 This type of inquiry is precisely the type
209
advocated by the dissent in Banks.
3. Balancing While Deferring. The dissent’s application of the
Turner test presents a possible modification that could replace the
abridged Turner factors and thus create a new test for deprivation for
rehabilitation situations. The dissent’s approach, articulated by
Justice Stevens, does precisely what the Turner Court itself did when
faced with a justification that a deprivation was rehabilitative: it
analyzes the deprivation using the applicable Turner factors and
scrutinizes whether the regulation is an exaggerated response to the
valid penological objective of rehabilitation.210 This approach more
accurately reflects the Turner Court’s intent to maintain a balancing
test for prisoners’ rights and should be the approach adopted by the
lower courts.
Justice Stevens in his dissent carefully reviewed the justifications
211
for the restrictive policy given by the prison administrators. Even
absent any facts put forth by Banks, the dissent used logic and
experience to find enough problems with the justifications put forth
by the administrators to conclude reasonable fact finders could differ
on their determinations about the constitutionality of the policy.212
This application deals with the difficulty created by consolidating the
test and replaces the other three Turner factors with another

207. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 138, at 272.
208. See id. (“In invalidating the ban on inmate marriages, the Turner Court did not defer
unquestioningly to the prison administration’s determination of the rehabilitative benefits.”).
209. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572, 2588–89 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(encouraging courts to be particularly cautious in evaluating prison policies justified primarily
on the basis of deprivation for rehabilitation).
210. See id. (finding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the regulation was an
“exaggerated response” to the prison’s legitimate rehabilitation interest); see also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97–98 (1987) (explaining that the marriage regulation is an exaggerated
response to a valid objective).
211. Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2586–90 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 2588–89. Similarly, the Court in Turner carefully scrutinized the justifications
offered by the prison administrators and found they were not enough to sustain the regulation.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 99.
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mechanism for determining the constitutionality of prison regulations
restricting constitutional rights—a more searching inquiry behind the
prison adminstrators’ justifications. Though the dissenters also
dispensed with three of the Turner factors, they nevertheless
conceptualized the application of the first factor differently and found
the connection between the policy and a valid penological objective
213
too attenuated to be constitutional. The dissent’s reading of the first
factor implied a scrutiny of the government’s justifications that
cannot act simultaneously with the high level of deference granted to
214
the government by both the plurality and the concurrence. The
dissenters’ evaluation of whether the policy was an exaggerated
response to a valid penological objective standardizes this scrutiny.215
The differences in the amount of deference given, including the
possibility that a decrease in deference might effectively replace the
eliminated Turner factors, present possible alternative ways to read
the test for rehabilitative deprivation situations.
When the dissenters agreed with the plurality that three of the
Turner factors were inapplicable in deprivation for rehabilitation
situations, they added another mechanism whereby the prisoners’
rights previously protected by balancing the factors could remain
protected—decreasing the deference given to the opinions of prison
216
The dissenters looked more carefully at the
administrators.
justifications of the prison administrators to ensure that they were not
merely an “exaggerated response” to the prison’s legitimate interest
in rehabilitation.217 Though the Turner test always contained this
“exaggerated response” language,218 it was not necessary to separately
examine regulations because balancing the four factors already
ensured there was no exaggeration. When only one factor and no
balancing is used, an “exaggerated response” analysis gives teeth to
the test. This exaggerated response analysis would require something
more than a mere assertion by prison administrators that a

213. See Banks, 126 S. Ct. at 2588–89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214. See id. (explaining that to ensure that Turner continues to impose meaningful limits on
government action, courts should cautiously evaluate the justifications put forth by prison
administrators).
215. Id.
216. See id. at 2589–90 (refusing to simply accept justifications given by prison
administrators without additional evidence).
217. Id. at 2588–90.
218. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987).
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deprivation of constitutional rights will improve behavior for those
rights to be constitutionally restricted or removed.
Thus, the dissenters and the plurality each applied the first
Turner factor, asking whether there was a valid rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate government interest
put forward to justify it. Then, in addition, the dissenters asked
whether the justification given was an exaggerated response to this
objective. Following the example of the Banks dissenters and
requiring prison administrators to demonstrate in some tangible
way—beyond a mere assertion by the administrators—that the policy
is meaningfully connected to rehabilitation before granting summary
judgment would allow the Court to maintain the substantive judicial
review it developed in Turner, Johnson, and other precedent without
becoming embroiled in the complex problems of prison
administration. In situations in which only some of the Turner factors
are useful, giving teeth to Turner by examining prison officials’
justifications in a meaningful way is precisely the modification needed
to maintain the purpose of the Turner test. This proposed
modification of the test better furthers the purpose of judicial review
of prison administration, follows Turner’s analysis of a deprivation for
rehabilitation situation, and better reflects the actions of the Court in
other situations in which facts did not fit the Turner test.
CONCLUSION
In addition to furthering the theory of incarceration already
established by the Court in its previous prisoners’ rights cases, the
mechanism used by the Banks dissenters fills the gap in constitutional
protection created by consolidation of the Turner factors in
deprivation for rehabilitation situations. By requiring prison
administrators to demonstrate in some tangible way that a restrictive
policy is meaningfully connected to rehabilitation, the Court could
maintain the substantive judicial review it developed in Turner
without becoming embroiled in the complex problems of prison
administration. This approach would enable the Court to more
critically examine the justifications of prison administrators to ensure
those justifications are not merely an exaggerated response to a valid
penological concern. It would also allow the Court to build on
precedent to provide clarity to yet another aspect of this “theory of
incarceration” without deciding questions not before it and without
requiring it to create a new theory out of “whole cloth.”
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Judicial review of government actions protects and sustains the
constitutional rights of all Americans. This judicial review is even
more essential to the increasingly large portion of society which is,
was, or will be incarcerated. As prison populations continue to grow,
the complexities and difficulties of prison administration will only
increase. Balancing the need for deference to those prison
administrators on the front lines with the need for meaningful judicial
review of prison policies has always been a challenge for the courts. If
courts refuse to recognize the weight on the scales of either of these
interests, the present prison system will quickly become
unsustainable. Courts cannot act as prison administrators from afar,
making the daily decisions of authoritarian administration, nor can
they completely abrogate their role as protectors of the Constitution
for those most in need. Thus the Court is compelled to strike a
balance. For many years Turner provided that balance. Moving
toward absolute deference and rendering Turner toothless would do
more than undermine decades of jurisprudence. It would leave the
system prone to abuse and eventually unsustainable, and it would
leave prisoners with no way to protect the rights granted to them by
the Constitution.

